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Abstract
We investigate the long-run effects of government surveillance on civic capital and economic
performance, studying the case of the Stasi in East Germany. Exploiting regional variation in the
number of spies and administrative features of the system, we combine a border discontinuity
design with an instrumental variable strategy to estimate the long-term, post-reunification effect
of government surveillance. We find that a higher spying density led to persistently lower levels
of interpersonal and institutional trust in post-reunification Germany. We also find substantial and
long-lasting economic effects of Stasi surveillance, resulting in lower income, higher exposure to
unemployment, and lower self-employment. (JEL: H11, N34, N44, P20)
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Ciccone, Arnaud Chevalier, Ernesto Dal Bó, Denvil Duncan, Frederico Finan, Corrado Giulietti, Yuriy
Gorodnichenko, Emanuel Hansen, Mark Harrison, Johannes Hermle, Paul Hufe, David Jaeger, Pat Kline,
Michael Krause, Ulrike Malmendier, Andreas Peichl, Gerard Pfann, Martin Peitz, Nico Pestel, Anna
Raute, Derek Stemple, Jochen Streb, Uwe Sunde, Nico Voigtländer, Johannes Voget, Fabian Waldinger,
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1. Introduction
Autocracies have been the dominant form of government in human history. Despite
substantial shifts toward more democratic political institutions in recent decades,
autocratic regimes still rule in more than a quarter of the countries worldwide (see
Online Appendix Figure C.1), accounting for more than one third of the world
population (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2014). A common, defining characteristic
of autocracies is the repression of oppositional movements to ensure political stability
and avoid revolution (Gerschewski 2013; Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2017). Although
regimes differ in their mix of repressive measures, all need to extract precise
information about oppositional movements within the population. To this end, they
operate large-scale state surveillance systems that monitor the population (Davenport
2005). These repressive surveillance measures, reaching deep into private lives, may in
turn affect individual social behavior, creating a widespread atmosphere of suspicion
and distrust toward fellow citizens and state institutions, and thereby transform civil
society (Arendt 1951). While qualitative historical research and numerous media
contributions support this mechanism, there is no systematic empirical evidence
documenting the detrimental effects of such repressive measures on society.1
In this paper, we intend to advance our understanding of the legacy of repression
by studying the case of the socialist German Democratic Republic (GDR). The GDR
was an autocratic state, whose repressive policies were explicitly built upon silent
methods of surveillance rather than overt persecution and violence (Knabe 1999).
As a result, the regime implemented one of the largest and densest surveillance
networks of all time. The Ministry for State Security, commonly referred to as the Stasi,
administered a huge body of so-called Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter, unofficial informers.
These informers accounted for around 1% of the East German population in the 1980s
and were regarded as the regime’s most important instrument to secure power (Müller-
Enbergs 1996, p. 305). Informers were ordinary citizens who kept their regular jobs
but secretly gathered information within their professional and social network, thus
betraying the trust of friends, neighbors, and colleagues (Bruce 2010). A large body
of historical research deems the effects of the surveillance apparatus as devastating,
having shattered interpersonal trust with long-lasting consequences: “The oppressive
effects of the constant threat of Stasi surveillance [...] can scarcely be overstated. It led
to perpetual insecurity in personal relationships, and was to leave a difficult legacy for
post-reunification Germany” (Fulbrook 2009, p. 221).2
1. A limited number of papers studies determinants of state repression, mostly focusing on specific
configurations of political institutions that lead to repression (Collier and Rohner 2008; Besley and Persson
2009). Similarly, studies in other social sciences primarily analyze political and societal factors that lead
regimes to use coercive power; only few studies investigate microlevel effects of repression on groups
such as environmental activists (see Davenport 2007 and Earl 2011, for surveys in political science and
sociology, respectively).
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We put these claims to a test by estimating the long-term, post-reunification
effects of state surveillance on society after the fall of the GDR regime. Using
administrative data on the ubiquitous network of informers, we construct a measure
of local surveillance intensity and exploit administrative features of the Stasi to set-up
a quasi-experimental research design. To operationalize the effect of surveillance on
social and cooperative behavior, we choose standard measures of interpersonal and
institutional trust that have been seen as key components in broader measures of civic
capital (Knack and Keefer 1997; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2008, 2010).3 While
the general nature of autocratic repression suggests deteriorations in individuals’ trust
in institutions, the specific use of informers within social networks makes interpersonal
trust another well-suited measure to proxy the social costs of surveillance. Last, we
additionally test whether Stasi surveillance had an effect on measures of economic
performance such as income and unemployment, as civic capital has been shown to be
positively associated with economic outcomes (see Algan and Cahuc 2014, Chap. 2,
and Fuchs-Schündeln and Hassan 2016, Chap. 12, for surveys, and the more detailed
discussion below).
Our empirical strategy explicitly addresses the concern that recruitment of
informers across space might not have been random by combining a border
discontinuity design with an instrumental variables approach that takes advantage of the
specific administrative structure of the surveillance state. Stasi district offices bore full
responsibility for securing their territory and supervising the respective subordinate
county offices, which caused surveillance intensities to differ substantially across
GDR districts (Engelmann and Schumann 1995). Important for our identification
strategy, this structure was at odds with the fully centralized political system of the
GDR, which followed the Leninist principle of Democratic Centralism in allocating
all political powers and legislative competencies to the level of the central government
(Bartsch 1991, Chap. 4; Niemann 2007). This set-up allows us to use discontinuities
in surveillance intensities along district borders as a source of exogenous variation.
Using the leave-out average surveillance intensity at the district level as an instrument,
we further isolate the part of the variation in the county-level spying density that is
explained by differences in surveillance strategies across districts.
Overall, the results of our study offer substantial evidence for negative and long-
lasting effects of government surveillance on civic capital and economic performance.
Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), we find that a higher
spying density leads to lower trust in strangers and stronger negative reciprocity, two
standard measures predicting cooperative behavior (Glaeser et al. 2000; Dohmen et al.
2009). In terms of magnitude, we find that a one standard deviation increase in the
3. We follow Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2010) and focus on civic capital defined as “those persistent
and shared beliefs and values that help a group overcome the free rider problem in the pursuit of socially
valuable activities”. Using this conceptualization has two major advantages. First, it addresses the critique
of too elastic definitions of social capital in the literature. Second, and important in the context of our
study, it highlights the importance of interpersonal and institutional trust, which are likely to be affected by
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spying density—equal to more than one third of the average surveillance intensity—
decreases trust (reciprocal behavior) by 0.1 (0.18) of a standard deviation. We further
observe negative effects on political participation as measured by individuals’ intention
to attend elections, political interest and engagement (Putnam 1993; Guiso, Sapienza,
and Zingales 2010). The effects on civic capital are accompanied by negative and
persistent effects on measures of economic performance. A one standard deviation
increase in the surveillance intensity reduces monthly individual income by €84 and
increases the time spent in unemployment by five days per year on average.
Moreover, we find negative effects on self-employment, with entrepreneurial spirit
being one likely channel linking trust and economic performance (Knack and Keefer
1997). Importantly, we corroborate these estimates using administrative wage and
turnout data at the regional level. Investigating the dynamics of our effects, we further
find effects on civic capital to precede economic effects, which is in line with our
theoretical priors that reductions in civic capital lead to worse economic outcomes.
Our empirical results become stronger when tightening identification and moving
from cross-sectional OLS estimates to the border design-IV specification. In line with
this finding, we further show that effects are stronger at district borders separating
counties that had been part of the same province during the time of the Weimar
Republic and share the same cultural heritage. In addition, we provide a wide range
of tests to demonstrate the robustness of our results with respect to (i) different
measures of surveillance such as political arrests, (ii) alternative definitions of the
instrument, (iii) different specifications of the border design, and (iv) alternative ways
to draw inference. Moreover, we rule out alternative mechanisms that may explain our
economic effects, such as surveillance-induced differences in risk aversion, personality
traits unrelated to trust, or preferences for redistribution. Last, we take a closer look
at the channels behind our economic effects, providing evidence that differences in
educational attainment are a main driver. We link these differences to reductions in
civic capital, corroborating the prediction that higher levels of trust should lead to
higher investments in (human) capital (Goldin and Katz 1999).
Our study is closely linked to the steadily growing literature on the relationship
between institutions, culture, and economic performance (see Algan and Cahuc 2014;
Alesina and Giuliano 2015 as well as Fuchs-Schündeln and Hassan 2016 for recent
surveys and Section 3 for a more detailed discussion of the literature). We show
that rather short-lived political institutions can have persistent, long-term effects on
important economic preferences and—more generally—cultural traits. Our findings
complement other studies that use variation in deep, cultural differences such as
religion, ethnicity, or education to explain contemporaneous differences in economic
preferences, beliefs, and values (Tabellini 2010; Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn 2013).
In addition, we also provide evidence documenting the long-term positive effects of
institutional quality on economic performance (La Porta et al. 1997) and relate to
recent evidence showing that too little (but also too much) individual trust leads to
negative economic outcomes (Butler, Giuliano, and Guiso 2016). Econometrically, we
refine current identification strategies used in the literature to estimate causal effects
of formal institutions on culture and economic outcomes by combining within-country
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Tabellini 2017). We further break new ground by studying the long-term effects of
repression in autocratic regimes, in our context state surveillance, on social behavior
and economic performance. Thereby, we complement studies on the macro level that
show positive effects of democracy on growth (Rodrik and Wacziarg 2005; Acemoglu
et al. 2019). In particular, and similar to Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) in the case of
slave trade in Africa, we show that the GDR surveillance state destroyed civic capital
and led to mistrust toward others and the political system.
Moreover, we contribute to the literature investigating the transformation and
legacy of countries of the former Eastern Bloc after the fall of the Iron Curtain (see, e.g.,
Shleifer 1997). Although evidence on the social and economic consequences of the fall
of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe is mixed (cf. the discussion in Alesina
and Giuliano 2015), our paper complements evidence that features of these regimes had
long-lasting social and economic effects. Looking at the German case, we show that
the East German regime did not only affect individual preferences for redistribution
as demonstrated by Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007), but also had long-lasting
effects on economic preferences and performance. In line with Fuchs-Schündeln and
Masella (2016), we further document that contemporaneous differences in labor market
outcomes can be attributed to features of the socialist regime. Last, our paper is related
to two other studies that investigate the effects of Stasi surveillance.4 Importantly,
our analysis is related to earlier work by Jacob and Tyrell (2010) who were the
first to investigate the relationship between surveillance, social capital, and economic
backwardness in East Germany. In our paper, we try to contribute to this work by
implementing a quasi-experimental research design that is able to establish a causal link
between government surveillance, civic capital, and economic performance. Moreover,
we take a closer look at the underlying mechanisms driving the effects. A second paper
by Friehe, Pannenberg, and Wedow (2015), pursued simultaneously but independently
from our project, investigates the effects of Stasi surveillance on personality traits.
While both studies document negative effects of government surveillance, which can
be partly reconciled with our findings, we suggest a novel identification strategy that
explicitly addresses the nonrandomness of the county-level surveillance density. Going
beyond cross-sectional correlations, we demonstrate that ignoring the endogeneity of
the regional surveillance intensity can lead to a non-negligible bias in the estimates.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the historical
background, the institutional details of the Stasi surveillance system, and our measure
of the regional surveillance intensity. In light of the GDR surveillance state, Section 3
lays out our conceptual framework, combining theoretical predictions with empirical
insights from the literature on trust and economic performance. Section 4 describes
the data used in the empirical analysis and introduces our research design. Results are
presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
4. In addition, Glitz and Meyersson (forthcoming) exploit information provided by East German foreign
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2. The GDR Surveillance State
After Germany’s unconditional surrender and the end of World War II in May 1945,
the country’s territory west of the Oder-Neisse line was divided among the four Allied
Forces—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union. While
the Western forces soon established the principles of democracy and free markets
in their respective zones, the Soviet Union implemented a socialist regime in the
eastern part of the country. In May 1949, the ideological division of the nation was
institutionalized when the Federal Republic of Germany was established on the territory
of the three western zones. Five months later, the German Democratic Republic (GDR)
was constituted in the Soviet ruled zone, which eventually led to a 40 year long division
of the country.
In the early years, the GDR was under constant internal pressure. Dissatisfaction
with working conditions and the implementation of socialism culminated in the
People’s Uprising on and around June 17, 1953, when an unexpected wave of strikes
and demonstrations hit the country. Moreover, from 1949 to 1961, roughly 2.7 million
citizens (around 20% of the population) managed to leave the country by authorized
migration or illegal border crossing (see Figure C.2 in the Online Appendix). Securing
the inner-German border in 1952 was not sufficient to stop this exodus, as people
were still able to escape to the West relatively easily via the divided city of Berlin.
Eventually, the regime stopped the substantial population loss by building the Berlin
Wall in 1961, and ordering soldiers to shoot at every person trying to illegally cross
the inner-German border. Between 1962 and 1988 only around 0.1% of the population
managed to emigrate on an annual basis (6%–7% of which were illegal border crossings
to the West).
Throughout most of the 1960s and 1970s, East and West Germany increasingly
grew apart in their social and cultural patterns, leading to a situation of relative political
stability. East Germans “felt they had to try to work with socialism, and to confront
and make the best of the constraints within which they had to operate” (Fulbrook
2009, p. 174). In the late 1970s, dissident tendencies resurfaced and became stronger
throughout the 1980s, leading to the fall of the Berlin Wall on the evening of Novem-
ber 9, 1989. This event marked the beginning of the dissolution of the GDR, which
officially ended with the reunification of West and East Germany in October 1990.
The Principle of Democratic Centralism. Throughout its existence, the GDR was
an autocracy under the rule of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) and its secretaries
general. Its organization closely followed the Soviet example of a highly centralized
state, with all political power being held by the Politburo in East Berlin. Importantly,
the GDR followed the Leninist principle of Democratic Centralism, which stipulated
that all local authorities were subordinate to the administration at the central level
in order to secure uniformity of governance (Bartsch 1991). To this end, the regime
quickly abolished existing decentralized political institutions from the times of the
Weimar Republic and eliminated the power of subnational entities. In a first step,
the Soviet occupying forces formed the five intermediate jurisdictions Mecklenburg,
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1952 and replaced by 15 administrative districts (Bezirke).5 Districts were deprived
of all legislative powers: “In lieu of a state that showed rudimentary features of a
federal structure, a unity state with a uniform administration from the top to the
smallest municipality was implemented” (Mampel 1982, p. 1123, own translation).
“The legislative competence was exclusively allocated to the central level: local
authorities—districts, counties, or municipalities—had the responsibility to locally
implement the directives coming from the central level” (Kotsch and Engler 2017,
p. 35, own translation). Using a direct quote from the district official Ulrich Schlaak,
Second Secretary of the SED in the district of Potsdam: “The only task [of districts]
was to execute the decisions made by the central committee. This was their raison
d’être” (as cited in Niemann 2007, p. 198, own translation). This is a key feature of
our identification strategy described in Section 4.2.
The decision on how to delineate districts was the result of a complex and eventually
quite unsystematic process. The overarching goal of the regime was to curb the
political and economic influence of the former Weimar provinces by establishing
spatial economic equality—a key feature of the Leninist organization of the state
(Ostwald 1989; Kotsch and Engler 2017). District boundaries were created to re-
establish the “proportionality” of regional economic activity, in particular with respect
to the distribution of productive forces, a cornerstone of the Socialist and Communist
ideology (Schmidt-Renner 1953). According to an internal note by Hans Warnke, a
government official in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, from 1952, the following—
potentially conflicting—additional factors played a role in this process: the external
borders (land and sea) were to be administered by as few districts as possible; district
capitals were to be easily accessible from all counties (without being forced to pass the
old province capital); certain industries, such as agriculture, energy/mining, or textile,
were to be clustered in certain districts (reprinted in Werner, Kotsch, and Engler 2017).
Overall, the entire process was unsystematic and turbulent—with last minute changes
being made in certain regions such as Brandenburg. As a consequence, the goal of
separating districts due to economic considerations was rarely achieved (Kotsch and
Engler 2017).
Districts were immediately dissolved after reunification and replaced by five federal
states. This happened “noiselessly and without any consequences” as the districts had
always been considered as administrative, artificial artifacts that had never “shaped an
own identity” among the population of the GDR (Neitmann 2017).
The Ministry for State Security. In February 1950, just a few months after the
proclamation of the GDR, the Ministry for State Security, generally known as
the Stasi, was founded. It served as the internal (and external) intelligence agency of the
regime. Its official mission was to “battle against agents, saboteurs, and diversionists
[in order] to preserve the full effectiveness of [the] Constitution.”6 Soon after its
5. Initially, 14 districts were created. In 1961, East Berlin was declared a district of its own.
6. According to Erich Mielke, subsequent Minister for State Security from 1957 to 1989, on January 28,
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foundation and the unforeseen national uprising against the regime in June 1953, the
Stasi substantially expanded its activities and turned into an ubiquitous institution,
spying on and suppressing the entire population to ensure and preserve the regime’s
power (Gieseke 2014, p. 50ff).
The key feature of the Stasi’s surveillance strategy was the use of “silent” methods
of repression rather than legal persecution by the police (Knabe 1999). To this end,
the Stasi administered a dense network of unofficial informers, the regime’s “main
weapon against the enemy”7, who secretly gathered detailed inside knowledge about
the population. “Informers were seen as an excellent way of preventing trouble before
it started [...]” (Childs and Popplewell 1996, p. 83). In the 1980s, the Stasi listed
around 85,000 regular employees and 142,000 unofficial informers, which accounted
for around 0.5% and 0.84% of the population, respectively.8
The organizational structure of the Stasi differed markedly from the otherwise
highly centralized political system. Having been decentralized from the very beginning,
responsibilities of the Stasi’s regional offices were further increased during the mid-
1950s to extract information from the society in a more efficient manner (Naimark
1994; Engelmann and Schumann 1995). In line with this strategy, Stasi district offices
(Bezirksdienststellen) bore full responsibility for securing their territory and were
independent in how to achieve this goal (Gill and Schröter 1991; Gieseke 2014).9
As a consequence of the decentralized structure, surveillance strategies differed
substantially across GDR districts. Overall, district differences account for more than
a quarter of the variation in the informer density across counties.10 This institutional
feature is the key attribute we build our identification strategy on (cf. Section 4.2).
Although many historical accounts acknowledge the considerable differences in
surveillance intensities across districts, only a few discuss potential reasons for the
heterogeneity. “[The different intensities] do not of course tell us why there were
relatively more IM in Cottbus than in Magdeburg, Postsdam or Berlin. Was it due to
the zealousness of the Stasi officers in that district or were there other factors involved?
Cottbus [a district with a considerably high spying density] was a frontier district
with Poland, but so were Frankfurt/Oder and Dresden” (Childs and Popplewell 1996,
p. 85). Following these different historical accounts, we can loosely separate “hard”
7. Directive 1/79 of the Ministry for State Security for the work with unofficial collaborators (Müller-
Enbergs 1996, p. 305).
8. The number of regular Stasi employees was notably high compared to the size of other secret services
in the Eastern Bloc (see, e.g., Albats 1995; Gieseke 2014, p. 72; Harrison and Zaksauskiene 2015).
9. The Minister of State Security in Berlin hardly influenced the activities and directives governed by
the heads of the district offices (Gill and Schröter 1991). Moreover, according to various accounts, the
Politburo did not exert any control over the Ministry of State Security from the mid-1950s onward (see
Childs and Popplewell 1996, p. 67).
10. Similarly, there were sharp differences in other domains of the surveillance system. For instance,
around one third of the constantly monitored citizens (Personen in ständiger Überwachung) were living
in the district of Karl–Marx–Stadt (Horsch 1997), which accounted for only 11% of the total population.
Likewise, 17% of the two million bugged telephone conversations were tapped in the district of Magdeburg,
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from “soft” factors as drivers of district-level differences in surveillance intensities.
The former ones include population size, the presence of strategically important
firms and/or industries as well as the strength of the political opposition (Horsch
1997; Müller-Enbergs 2008). Besides these systematic drivers, soft and arguably more
random determinants, such as the district leadership’s effort, zeal, or loyalty to the
regime, are acknowledged as potential drivers of different surveillance intensities
across districts (Gill and Schröter 1991; Childs and Popplewell 1996; Müller-Enbergs
2008). We discuss the implications for our identification strategy in Section 4.3,
paragraph “Correlated District Discontinuities”.
Unofficial Informers. Each district office had full authority over the county offices
(Kreisdienststellen) and on-site offices (Objektdienststellen) within their territory.11 In
total, there were 209 county offices, which executed the commands and orders from
their respective district office and recruited and administered Stasi informers. These
informers were instructed to secretly collect information about individuals in their own
network. It was thus necessary for informers to pursue their normal lives as friends,
colleagues, and neighbors. To report suspicious behavior, informers secretly met with
their responsible Stasi officer on a regular basis.
The process of informer recruitment was almost exclusively demand-driven as
informers were selected by a Stasi official. Individuals that approached the Stasi to
volunteer were generally not accepted (Müller-Enbergs 1996). Reasons for cooperating
with the Stasi were diverse. Some citizens complied for ideological reasons, others
were attracted by personal benefits (e.g., with regard to their regular job, see Müller-
Enbergs 2013). Only in very rare cases, citizens were compelled to act as unofficial
informers (Fulbrook 2005, p. 242f).
With the collected intelligence at hand, the Stasi was able to draw a detailed
picture of anti-socialist and dissident movements within the society and to exert
an overall “disciplinary and intimidating effect” on the population (Gieseke 2014,
p. 84f). Numerous historical accounts suggest that the population was aware of the
large network of informers: according to Bruce (2010), the vast majority of citizens
had direct contact with the Stasi multiple times throughout their lives; Reich (1997)
describes that citizens felt the Stasi’s presence like a “scratching T-shirt”; Fulbrook
(1995) states that friendships inevitably had a shadow of distance and doubt; Wolle
(2009) writes that the threat of being denounced caused an atmosphere of mistrust and
suspicion within a deeply torn society. “The very knowledge that the Stasi was there
and watching served to atomize society, preventing independent discussion in all but
the smallest groups” (Popplewell 1992). The consequence was “the breakdown of the
bonds of trust between officers and men, lawyers and clients, doctors and patients,
teachers and students, pastors and their communities, friends and neighbors, family
members and even lovers” (Childs and Popplewell 1996, p. 111). The preferred method
11. On-site offices were separate entities in seven strategically important public companies or universities.






/jeea/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jeea/jvaa009/5823502 by guest on 26 N
ovem
ber 2020
10 Journal of the European Economic Association
of the Stasi was “to build up and propagate distorted stories with enough kernel of
truth to sow suspicion and discredit the individual” (Fulbrook 1995, p. 54), eventually
destroying relationships, reputations, and careers.
The gathered intelligence also served as a basis for further actions by the regime,
such as arrests and imprisonments for political reasons or the use of physical violence.
Moreover, historical evidence shows that the spying activities led to other forms of
nonpersecutive, yet perceivable and important real-life consequences: among others,
students suspected of anti-regime behavior/attitudes were denied the opportunity to
study at the university, employees, and workers were not promoted or even dismissed
(Bruce 2010, p. 103f).12 Importantly, the regime did not only sanction direct dissident
behavior, but also followed the principle of collective punishment. As a consequence,
family members of regime critics or dissidents regularly got into trouble as well.
Measuring Government Surveillance. As the Stasi saw unofficial collaborators as
their main instrument, we choose the county-level share of informers in the population
as our preferred measure of government surveillance. Although the Stasi was able to
destroy parts of its files in late 1989, much of the information was preserved when
protesters started to occupy Stasi offices across the country. In addition, numerous
shredded files have been restored since reunification by the Stasi Records Agency
(BStU)—a government agency established in 1990/1991 to safe-keep and secure the
Stasi Records and to provide citizens, researchers, and media access to these files.
Our data on the number of unofficial informers in each county are based on these
official records. Most of the data have been compiled in Müller-Enbergs (2008). Until
today, the Stasi Records Agency keeps restoring old files and releasing new data
and information. Hence, we were able to extend the information in Müller-Enbergs
(2008) with additional data for previously unobserved counties that we collected from
the archives of the Agency. Overall, this allows us to observe the spying density for
around 92% of the counties at least once in the 1980s.13
The Stasi officially differentiated operative collaborators (IM1) from collaborators
providing logistics (IM2).14 Our baseline measure of the county-level spying density
is based on the number of operative collaborators as these informers were actively
involved in spying, constituted the largest and most relevant group of collaborators,
12. For more popular representations of the impact of the Stasi, see the Academy Award-winning movie
“The Lives of Others” and the TED talk “The Dark Secrets of a Surveillance State” given by the former
director of the Berlin-Hohenschönhausen Stasi prison memorial, Hubertus Knabe.
13. The available data is exhaustive. The BStU recovers all available documents for one county office
before moving to the next one. Pre-1980 data are only available for a limited number of counties.
14. In some of the Stasi’s informer accounts, there is a third category called “societal collaborators”.
These individuals were publicly known to be loyal to the regime and usually not involved in spying. Rather,
these collaborators were asked to actively and openly support the Stasi and the regime (Kowalczuk 2013).
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and exhibit the best data coverage across counties.15 If an on-site office was located
in a county, we add the respective number of informers to the county total and
explicitly control for the presence of these on-site offices in the econometric analysis.
As information on the total number of collaborators is not given for each year in every
county, we use the average spying density between 1980 and 1988 as our measure
of surveillance. The spying density was stable over the 1980s, the within-county
correlation being 0.91. For further details on our main explanatory variable, see Online
Appendix B. As operative informers were the central weapon of the surveillance
system, this measure is arguably the best proxy to pick up the effect of the Stasi as
a whole. By definition, this overall effect also comprises the specific modus operandi
of the Stasi, that is, using informers within social networks. We discuss and test the
quality of our measure of surveillance in Sections 4.3 and 5.2.
Figure 1 plots the regional variation of surveillance intensity, darker colors
indicating higher spying densities. The surveillance intensity differs considerably
both across and within GDR districts. The share of operative informers in a county
ranges from 0.12% to 1.03%, the mean density being 0.38% (see Online Appendix
Table B.2 for more detailed distributional information). The median is similar to the
mean (0.36%), and one standard deviation is equal to 0.14 informers per capita. In
our regressions, we standardize the share of informers by dividing it by one standard
deviation in the respective sample.
3. Conceptual Framework and Related Literature
Autocratic regimes generally secure their power by establishing a system of obedience
through the creation of fear and the constant threat of denunciation (Arendt 1951).
In the example of the GDR and its ubiquitous surveillance state, the aforementioned
historical accounts reiterate this mechanism, suggesting that the Stasi had a strong
impact on people’s social behavior as informers intruded deep into the private spheres
of the East German population (see, e.g., Fulbrook 2009). Given the historical context, it
thus seems plausible that the repressive political environment shaped citizens’ attitudes
toward political institutions and affected the way citizens cooperated with and trusted
each other.
Against this background, we study the effect of the surveillance state on civic
capital, defined as “those persistent and shared beliefs and values that help a group
overcome the free rider problem in the pursuit of socially valuable activities” (Guiso,
Sapienza, and Zingales 2010). This definition emphasizes “values and beliefs, which
are shared by a community and persistent over time, often passed on to its member
through intergenerational transmissions, formal education, or socialization” (Guiso,
Sapienza, and Zingales 2010). We focus on civic capital for three reasons. First, the
15. Nonetheless, we show that results are robust when combining both categories, hence using the total
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FIGURE 1. Spying intensity across counties. This figure shows the county-level surveillance density
measured by the average yearly share of operative unofficial informers relative to the population
between 1980 and 1988. Source: See Online Appendix B. Maps: MPIDR and CGG (2011) and
@EuroGeographics.
definition narrows the concept of social capital, which sometimes lacks precision
(Solow 1995), to norms and beliefs that help a community solve collective action
problems. These norms can be observed at the individual level by measures of trust
and cooperative behavior, as well as by cooperative behavior in the sociopolitical
context, for instance political engagement (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2010). We
select our main outcomes along these lines (cf. Section 4.1). Second and relatedly,
the concept fits our historical setting well: the ample qualitative evidence discussed in
Section 2 suggests that Stasi surveillance shattered individual trust, citizens’ confidence
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higher levels of civic capital have a direct economic payoff and can be incorporated in
standard economic models (Tabellini 2008; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2008).
Interpersonal trust as one key element of civic capital has long been seen as
an important economic preference which shapes economic outcomes (Almlund et al.
2011), given that every economic transaction involves an element of mutual confidence
(Arrow 1972). Among others, the importance of trust for economic performance
becomes apparent when thinking about transactions that involve future payments
or imperfect monitoring of performance, for example, in an employer–employee
relationship (Knack and Keefer 1997). This role of trust as an “economic primitive” has
been well documented in various studies in behavioral economics, which demonstrate
that trust fosters reciprocal behavior and cooperation, and thereby leads to more
efficient economic outcomes (see, e.g., Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995; Dohmen
et al. 2009). In addition to the direct effects of interpersonal trust and cooperative
norms on economic performance, trust may also indirectly shape economic activity
through the political process. As argued by Knack and Keefer (1997), less cooperative,
more self-interested individuals are less likely to vote, and thus monitor politicians
to a lesser extent. This could, in turn, result in a lower quality of economic policies,
which eventually triggers negative effects on economic performance. Consequently,
electoral turnout is a widely used outcome-based measure of social capital (see, e.g.,
Putnam 1993; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2004, 2010). Note that in the context
of our setting, the theoretical predictions on the effect of surveillance on institutional
trust, and in particular turnout, are ambiguous. On the one hand, it is possible that
individuals lost trust in politics, independent of the ideology. On the other hand, it
might well be the case that surveillance increased individuals’ dissatisfaction with the
Socialist regime and had a positive effect on electoral participation post reunification,
for instance, to prevent another Socialist episode. Eventually, the effect on turnout and
political engagement is thus an empirical question.
Building on previous evidence, the negative effects of Stasi spying on individual
trust/cooperative norms and—potentially—institutional trust are further expected to
be accompanied by negative economic effects. Various studies have investigated and
confirmed the link between trust and economic performance in other contexts (see
Algan and Cahuc 2014, for a detailed survey of the literature). Knack and Keefer
(1997) and Zak and Knack (2001) document a positive correlation between trust and
economic indicators across countries. In two related papers, Nunn (2008) and Nunn
and Wantchekon (2011) show that transatlantic and Indian Ocean slave trade still has a
causal and persistently negative effect on current trust levels and economic performance
in Africa. Algan and Cahuc (2010) isolate the trust that US descendants inherited from
their forebears who had immigrated from different countries at different dates and show
that variation in inherited trust impacts economic growth in the respective countries
of origin. In a series of papers, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2006, 2009) exploit
variation in deep cultural aspects, such as religious affiliation, to explain trust levels,
which in turn have real economic effects. Similarly, Tabellini (2010) exploits variation
in literacy rates and (the quality of) political institutions at the end of the 19th century
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in the 1990s. In a more recent study, Butler, Giuliano, and Guiso (2016) demonstrate
this relationship at the individual level, showing that too little (but also too much)
individual trust exhibits negative effects on individual income.
4. Data and Research Design
In the following, we first describe the data used for the empirical analysis (Section 4.1).
In Section 4.2, we develop our research design and set up the empirical model. In
Section 4.3, we provide an extensive discussion of potential challenges to identification
and a set of identification tests to corroborate our empirical strategy.
4.1. Data
To estimate the effect of surveillance on trust and economic performance, we use the
German Socio-Economic Panel Study, a longitudinal survey of German households
(Wagner, Frick, and Schupp 2007; Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) 2015). Established
for West Germany in 1984, the survey covers respondents from the former GDR since
June 1990. We focus on all East German respondents (below retirement age of 65)
in this first wave and follow them over time. This allows us to assign treatment (i.e.,
the spying density) based on the respondents’ county of residence in the year before
the fall of the Berlin Wall and observe respondents even when they changed residence
post reunification.
Main Outcomes. We proxy individual trust and cooperative behavior by the following
variables provided in the SOEP: trust in strangers [measured in 2003 and 2008] (Glaeser
et al. 2000; Naef and Schupp 2009); reciprocal behavior [2005, 2010] (Dohmen et al.
2009); the intention to attend elections [2005, 2009], and general political interest
[1990–2010] as an alternative more frequently measured proxy for voting behavior
(Putnam 2000; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2004; Rodenburger 2018); political
engagement [1990–2010, with gaps] (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2010). We further
focus on three measures of economic performance. First, we use log mean income
between 1991 and 2010. Second, we calculate the total unemployment duration for each
individual over this period, defined as the number of months in unemployment relative
to the total number of months in the sample period. Third, we derive individuals’
time spent in self-employment; analogously defined as the number of years with an
episode of self-employment relative to the total number of years in self-employment
or regular employment in the sample period.16 Besides these main measures of civic
capital and economic performance, we use a range of other outcome variables to test
for alternative channels (cf. Section 5.3) and analyze potential underlying mechanisms
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(cf. Section 5.4). See Online Appendix Tables B.1 and B.2 for more information on
each outcome variable.
Controls. In our empirical model, we include control variables at the individual
and county level (vectors Xi and Hc in equation (1) introduced in Section 4.2). All
specifications control for the respondents’ age and gender as well as the presence of an
on-site office in a given county. We abstain from controlling for additional covariates
at the individual level such as marital status, household size, or education as these
variables might have been shaped by state surveillance. We investigate the effects of
Stasi surveillance on education in Section 5.4. At the county-level, we construct three
sets of control variables. First, we account for the size and demographic composition
of the counties in the 1980s. The corresponding set of controls comprises (i) a county’s
surface area (in logs), (ii) the log mean county population 1980–1988, (iii) the shares
of children and pensioners as of September 30, 1989, and (iv) whether the county is
rural or urban (Stadt-/Landkreis).17 Second, we account for differences in the sectoral
composition of counties. The set of industry controls comprises (i) the respective shares
of employees in the agricultural, energy/mining, and textile industry as of September
1989, that is, the industries that played a major role when the regime decided on how
to draw the new district borders in 1952 (cf. Section 2), (ii) the employment share
of cooperative members, and (iii) the goods value of industrial production in 1989
(in logs). Third, we control for historical/predetermined and potentially persistent
county differences in terms of economic performance and political ideology. The set
of historical controls comprises (i) the regional strength of the opposition as proxied
by the intensity of the uprising in June 1953 (cf. Section 2), (ii) the electoral turnout as
well as the Nazi and Communist vote shares in the federal election of March 1933 to
measure institutional trust and the level of political extremism (Voigtländer and Voth
2012), (iii) the regional share of Jews and Protestants in 1925 in order to control for
religious differences (Becker and Woessmann 2009), and (iv) the unemployment rate,
the share of white-collar and the share of self-employed workers in 1933 as proxies
for persistent productivity differences across local labor markets.
Summary Statistics. Summary statistics for all outcomes and controls on the
individual and county level are presented in Table B.2 in the Online Appendix.
4.2. Research Design
Our identification strategy exploits the administrative structure of the Stasi, where
district offices bore the full responsibility for securing their territory and administered
different average levels of the informer density at the county level. As a result, district
17. Controlling for surface area and population accounts for population density. The rural/urban dummy
is intended to pick up additional differences between independent cities (Stadtkreise) and so-called rural
counties (Landkreise) that consist of many municipalities, typically with one larger city, which is the capital
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FIGURE 2. Differences in spying intensity within/across districts. This figure plots the average
difference in the share of operative unofficial informers at the county level within (i) 336 county
pairs from the same district and (ii) 122 county pairs divided by district borders. Differences in
the average spying intensity between both groups are statistically significantly different from zero
(see the corresponding p-value). County pairs are weighted by the average county-level population.
Standard errors are clustered at the county-pair level, vertical bars show 95% confidence intervals.
See Online Appendix B for detailed information on all variables.
fixed effects explain more than a quarter of the county-level variation in the spying
density. We harness the resulting discontinuities along district borders as a source of
exogenous variation and set up a border design to derive causal effects. Intuitively, we
compare neighboring counties at different sides of a district border and use differences
in the spying density within these county pairs to identify the effect of government
surveillance on our respective outcomes (see, e.g., Holmes 1998; Dube, Lester, and
Reich 2010, for studies applying similar research designs).18
A precondition for the validity of this design is that there is meaningful variation
in the policy variable within county pairs at district borders. To test this, we identify
all possible neighboring county pairs within the GDR (discarding pairs with very short
common borderlines of less than 2 km) and calculate the mean within-pair difference
in the spying density.19 Figure 2 visualizes the policy-induced variation in the border
design by comparing the average within-pair differences in the spying density of
county pairs that straddle a district border to pairs within districts. The figure shows
that differences are significantly larger in county pairs that straddle a district border.
18. Our border design is related but different from a spatial regression discontinuity design (RDD) as, for
example, used in Dell (2010), where a two-dimensional discontinuity (longitude and latitude) is exploited
and a well-defined treatment border is approached. In our setting, the border design is preferable since
there are many treatment borders, such that there is not much of a hinterland that can be used to approach
the border. Figure 1 shows that the hinterland of one district border is oftentimes the border region of
another treatment border.
19. We discard the city of East Berlin from our analysis because it was a district on its own in the
1980s and we cannot separate East and West Berlin post reunification. We show that results are robust to






/jeea/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jeea/jvaa009/5823502 by guest on 26 N
ovem
ber 2020
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In the econometric model, we limit the analysis to contiguous county pairs on
different sides of a GDR district border (again discarding pairs with very short common
borderlines). In case of multiple neighbors on the other side of a district border, we
only consider the neighboring county that shares the longest border with the respective
county. On this sample, we regress outcome Y (see Section 4.1 for a detailed list of
outcomes) of individual i in county c, which is part of a border county pair b and situated
in the former Weimar province p, on the spying density in county c and county-pair
dummies b. Including only the subscript for the level at which the respective variables
vary, we formally estimate the following equation:
Yi D ˛ C ˇ  SPYDENSc C X i ı C H c' C b C p C "i : (1)
In addition to county-pair fixed effects, our preferred model includes sets of covariates
at the individual and county level, denoted Xi and Hc, respectively. At the individual
level, we control for the age and gender of the respondents. County-level covariates
account for the previously mentioned systematic factors determining the surveillance
strategy and include controls for differences in size and demography, industrial
composition, as well as pre-treatment differences in terms of economic performance
and political ideology (see Section 4.1 for a detailed description of control variables).
We also include a set of dummy variables indicating pre-World War II provinces from
the Weimar Republic, denoted p, which accounts for long-term cultural differences,
for example, between Prussia and Saxony, in a nonparametric way (see Appendix
Figure A.1 for a mapping of GDR districts into provinces from the times of the
Weimar Republic). In addition, all regressions include a dummy for the presence of an
on-site office (cf. Section 2). The error term is denoted by "i.
As discussed in Section 4.1, we observe some of the civic capital outcomes in
two waves only (trust, reciprocity, and attend elections).20 In these cases, we follow
Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) and pool observations from both waves and add
year fixed effects—results are robust when allowing for differential treatment effects
by survey wave or taking the mean outcome over time, see Online Appendix Table D.1.
In contrast, political interest, engagement in politics, and all economic outcomes are
observed over (almost) the full sample period from 1990 to 2010. For those variables,
we use the mean value over time. In addition, we present a dynamic specification, in
which we investigate the effect of Stasi surveillance over time, interacting all control
variables and fixed effects given in equation (1) with year dummies.
In our baseline specification, standard errors are two-way clustered at the county-
pair and county-in-1990 level to (i) allow for shocks affecting county pairs, and
(ii) account for the duplication of some counties in our preferred specification that
leads to multiple person-year observations in our sample. We provide a more detailed
discussion of alternative ways to calculate standard errors, such as clustering at the
district level, and demonstrate the robustness of our inference in Section 5.2.
20. This is also true for some outcomes used in the sensitivity checks such as risk aversion, the Big Five
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4.3. Identification
Equation (1) describes a standard border design that exploits variation within county
pairs. The identifying assumption is that a given county on the lower-spying side of
a district border is similar to its neighboring county on the higher-spying side in all
relevant characteristics except for the spying density. If this is fulfilled, the remaining
source of systematic variation is induced by district-level differences in surveillance
strategies, and our estimates capture the causal effect of the spying density. However,
several endogeneity concerns arise in this context, which could invalidate the design.
Within-Pair Confounders. One prime concern for identification is that unobservable
confounders within county pairs might drive parts of the county-level spying density.
We address this potential omitted variable bias problem in two ways. First, we explicitly
use the fact that districts held full responsibility for securing their territory and guiding
the respective county offices. Based on this insight, we strengthen identification by
combining the border design with an instrumental variables (IV) approach. Using the
district-level leave-out-average spying density as an instrument for the county-level
density, we isolate the district-level variation in the county-level spying density and use
it for identification within county pairs at district borders. The corresponding first-stage
equation for individual i in district d is then given by






SPYDENSk C Xi Qı C Hc Q' C Qb C Qp C i ; (2)
where county c’s district-level leave-out-average spying density is defined as the mean
spying density in district d, excluding county c’s contribution to this mean. Instead of







Second, we directly test whether observable county-specific characteristics differ
at district borders within pairs. Applying a standard covariate smoothness test for
discontinuity designs as suggested by Lee and Lemieux (2010), we separately regress
each county-level control variable as defined in Section 4.1 on the county-level spying
density. The coefficient provides a direct test of whether the respective covariate is
unrelated to the informer density. Appendix Table A.1 shows step-by-step how our
identification strategy is able to balance covariates. In column (1), we investigate the
smoothness of covariates in the full sample of all East German counties covered by
the SOEP and see that the spying density is significantly correlated with most of
our covariates. In column (2), we restrict the sample to counties at district borders
but do not include county-pair fixed effects. Hence, we still compare counties that
are far away from each other and might differ in many other dimensions than the
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F-test of all estimated coefficients being zero, reported at the bottom of Appendix
Table A.1, is rejected. In column (3), we eventually begin to restrict comparisons of
distant counties by introducing Weimar province fixed effects, which substantially
improves the balance of our sample, yet a few significant differences persist. In a
last step, we implement our border design by introducing county-pair fixed effects,
explicitly testing the smoothness of covariates within county pairs at district borders.
In column (4), none of the control variables turns out to be significant, which suggests
that our research design is able to balance the sample.
Reverse Causality. A related concern is reverse causality. Differences in the county-
level spying density might have been due to historical but still-prevailing differences
in trust or economic performance across counties. Although our instrumental variables
strategy—exploiting variation in the spying density due to differences in district-level
surveillance strategies—addresses reverse causality concerns, we can additionally
conduct a direct test for reverse causality in our border design. Using county-level
proxies from the 1920s and 1930s for our set of civic capital and economic performance
outcomes, we run our empirical model described in equation (1) at the county level.21
Table 1 provides the corresponding results. Overall, surveillance intensity cannot
explain differences in pre-treatment outcomes within county pairs, irrespective of
using control variables from the times of the GDR or not.
Correlated District Discontinuities. The main remaining threat to identification
arises from district-level discontinuities that might be systematically correlated with the
district-level spying density. Our IV design would not tackle this type of endogeneity
because the unobserved confounder would operate at the same level as the instrument.
As long as we observe the potential district-level confounders at the county level,
we can, however, test for smoothness within county pairs and control for systematic
differences if necessary. As discussed in Section 2, the overarching goal of the regime
when delineating districts was to establish regional economic equality in productive
forces. Although this does not necessarily lead to discontinuities within county pairs
at district borders, we test for such differences using county-level industrial output
and the number of workers as measures of economic activity. Appendix Table A.1
shows that these variables are smooth in our border design. The other relevant factor
that might induce a discontinuity was the regime’s goal to create industry clusters
in certain districts. Using detailed information on the industrial composition of the
workforce, we show that sector-specific worker shares are smooth within county pairs
at district borders (cf. Appendix Figure A.2). Nevertheless, we control for employment
21. Using election data from March 1933, we observe electoral turnout and vote shares for the extreme
right (the Nazi party, NSDAP) and the extreme left (Communist party, KPD). We proxy interpersonal
trust with the share of Protestants and Jews in 1925, two religious groups that have been shown to exhibit
higher levels of trust compared to Catholics (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2003). We also observe the
county-level unemployment rate and the share of self-employed in the population as of 1933. Last, we use
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TABLE 1. The effect of spying on historical outcomes.
Share Share Voter Extreme Unemp- Self- White
protest. Jews turnout vote loyment employ. collar
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Without control variables
County-level spying density 0.003 0.217  0.057  0.001 0.161 0.083 0.178
(0.138) (0.209) (0.201) (0.171) (0.219) (0.173) (0.205)
No. obs. 102 102 102 102 102 102 102
Adjusted R-squared 0.611 0.931 0.904 0.768 0.923 0.918 0.771
Panel B: Including GDR control variables
County-level spying density  0.115 0.168  0.047 0.006 0.143 0.076 0.048
(0.263) (0.197) (0.172) (0.211) (0.183) (0.166) (0.165)
No. obs. 102 102 102 102 102 102 102
Adjusted R-squared 0.759 0.969 0.957 0.857 0.969 0.963 0.887
Notes: This table shows the effect of a one standard deviation increase in surveillance intensity on different
measures of local civic capital and economic performance before the existence of the GDR (in the 1920s and
1930s). The underlying econometric model is described in equation (1), estimated at the county level. Each
specification includes dummy variables for the historical provinces of the Weimar Republic, a dummy variable
indicating the presence of a Stasi on-site office, and county-pair fixed effects. Panel A presents results in the
absence of any additional covariates. Panel B displays the corresponding results when controlling for the size
and demographic/industrial composition of counties in the 1980s, as well as the strength of the riot in June 1953
(see Section 4.1 for details). All outcome variables are standardized. All specifications are based on the sample
of contiguous county pairs that straddle a GDR district border and are covered in the SOEP. Population weights
are adjusted for the duplication of counties that are part of multiple pairs. Standard errors are two-way clustered
at the county-pair and the county level. See Online Appendix B for detailed information on all variables.
shares in the agriculture, energy/mining, and textile industry—those three sectors for
which clusters were to be formed (see Section 2 and Werner, Kotsch, and Engler
2017)—in our regressions. Moreover, we discussed a list of hard, district-level factors,
such as population size, oppositional strength, and again industrial composition, that
have been assumed to influence the district-level surveillance strategy (see Section 2).
Appendix Table A.1 shows that these potential confounders are smooth within county
pairs at district borders.
Historical accounts further suggest that soft factors, such as the personality of
the Stasi’s district leadership, led to differences in the intensity of surveillance across
districts (see the discussion in Section 2). We exploit the resulting variation, assuming
that differences in the district leaderships’ effort or loyalty affected individuals’ civic
capital and economic performance only due to differences in surveillance intensities.
Although this assumption is ultimately untestable, we argue that it is likely to hold
as the Stasi operated secretly and was not involved in economic production or the
political process (Gieseke 2014).
Moreover, other correlated district policies might threaten identification.
Importantly and as extensively discussed in Section 2, districts had no legislative
competencies. From the very beginning, the GDR followed the Leninist principle
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(Schulze 1991, Chap. 2). In this respect, the Council of Ministers, as the chief executive
body of the GDR, ensured that all decisions made by the Central Committee were
unconditionally implemented and executed at lower regional levels.
Selection Out of Treatment. Selection effects pre and post-reunification could further
invalidate our research design. While out-migration was very limited after the
construction of the Berlin Wall (cf. Section 2), residential mobility within the GDR
was also highly restricted as all living space was tightly administered and allocated
by municipal housing agencies (Grashoff 2011, p. 13f). Post reunification, we assign
treatment based on the county of residence in 1989 and follow individuals over time,
also when they change residency. In Section 5.4, we investigate the decision to move
after reunification as one potential channel driving our effects on civic capital and
economic outcomes. Results show that surveillance-induced mobility responses are of
little importance.
Measurement Error. Last, our proxy of surveillance intensity may not translate into
differences in people’s awareness of the Stasi. Although we cannot directly test for
differences in awareness during the times of GDR, we can do so post reunification.
Since 1992, any citizen has been able to file a request to view her or his personal Stasi
file. We acquired official data on the total number of individual requests for disclosure
(see Figure C.3 in the Online Appendix for the evolution of these requests over
time) at the district level from the Stasi Records Agency; unfortunately, county-level
information are not available. As shown in Panel A of Online Appendix Figure C.4,
we find a positive correlation between the per-capita number of individual requests in a
district and the corresponding district-level spying density. However, as this finding is
not derived from our border design model, we cannot attribute any causal interpretation
to it. For example, it might be true that the observed correlation is driven by district-
level differences in anti-regime attitudes that positively affected the spying density
and the number of requests. We test this argument in Panel B of Online Appendix
Figure C.4, where we plot the respective correlation when controlling for the district-
level number of exit visa applications as of December 31, 1988 and the date the district
experienced the first protest during the peaceful revolution of 1989—two measures
of anti-regime sentiment (Kern and Hainmueller 2009; Grdešić 2014). Controlling for
these two proxies leads to a stronger positive correlation between the spying density
and the number of disclosure requests, a finding we interpret as additional suggestive
evidence that citizens perceived differences in surveillance intensities.
Moreover, we could face measurement error in the main regressor if (i) informers
recruited by one county collected information on individuals located in the neighboring
county within the same county pair, or (ii) there was a quantity–quality trade-off in
terms of unofficial collaborators. Although we cannot rule out these mechanisms, both
would work against finding large effects and bias our estimates toward zero.
Sign of Bias. Although it would be interesting to formulate a clear ex ante hypothesis
about the sign of the endogeneity bias, the nature of endogeneity concerns discussed
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the direction of bias depends on whether the Stasi allocated more or less spies to
counties with historically low levels of trust. If low regional trust implies nonconformity
with the political system, the Stasi may have allocated more spies to low-trusting
counties and simple OLS regressions would provide an overestimate of the effect of
surveillance on trust. However, if low trust implies that regions were less economically
vibrant and less in favor of free markets ceteris paribus, the Stasi might have allocated
less spies to the specific counties and simple OLS would underestimate effects. Hence,
a prediction of the sign of the bias is ex ante ambiguous. The same holds true
for other endogeneity concerns discussed in Section 4.3 such that the direction of
bias remains an empirical question. Our step-wise implementation of the research
design (cf. Section 5.1) suggests ex post that endogeneity leads to a downward bias of
estimates.
5. Empirical Results
In the following, we present our empirical findings. Section 5.1 presents the main
results. In Section 5.2, we provide a range of tests to demonstrate the robustness of our
effects. In Section 5.3, we test whether alternative mechanisms may drive (parts of)
our results. Last, we investigate the channels behind our baseline effects in Section 5.4.
5.1. Main Results
In this section, we analyze the effect of spying on our measures of civic capital
and economic performance, applying the border design and combining it with our
instrumental variables approach as set up in equations (1) and (2). Tables 2 and 3
summarize our main findings. In order to demonstrate the relevance of our identification
strategy, we implement the research design step-by-step, starting in column (1) with
the naive OLS correlation for all counties and ending with the border-IV design
specification in column (6). The latter specification will be our preferred one throughout
the rest of the paper.
Overall, Table 2 shows significantly negative effects of surveillance on our
measures of civic capital. We find that a one standard deviation increase in the spying
density reduces individuals’ trust in strangers by 0.098 of a standard deviation (Panel A,
column (6)), and reciprocal behavior by 0.183 of a standard deviation (Panel B).
Panel C further shows that a one standard deviation increase in the spying density
decreases individuals’ probability to attend elections by 0.109 of a standard deviation,
corresponding to a decrease of 4.5 percentage points (or 5.6% relative to the mean).
Likewise, a standard deviation increase in the spying density lowers individuals’ overall
political interest and political engagement by 0.261 and 0.181 of a standard deviation,
respectively (cf. Panels D and E).
Table 3 summarizes the main results for our measures of economic performance.
Panel A shows that a one standard deviation increase in the spying intensity
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TABLE 2. The effect of spying on civic capital.
All counties Border county-pair sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Trust in strangers
County-level spying density 0.066 0.057  0.040  0.091  0.098
(0.032) (0.038) (0.028) (0.023) (0.034)
District-level spying density 0.094
(0.038)
No. obs. 3,175 1,795 1,795 1,795 1,795 1,795
Adjusted R-squared 0.008 0.031 0.117 0.149 0.147 0.149
Kleibergen–Paap F-Statistic 12.03
Panel B: Reciprocal behavior
County-level spying density  0.067 0.098  0.109  0.085 0.183
(0.034) (0.045) (0.038) (0.032) (0.069)
District-level spying density  0.178
(0.044)
No. obs. 2,835 1,588 1,588 1,588 1,588 1,588
Adjusted R-squared 0.053 0.065 0.141 0.185 0.187 0.181
Kleibergen–Paap F-statistic 15.40
Panel C: Attend elections
County-level spying density  0.009  0.081  0.067  0.087 0.109
(0.031) (0.036) (0.024) (0.032) (0.052)
District-level spying density 0.107
(0.044)
No. obs. 2,828 1,583 1,583 1,583 1,583 1,583
Adjusted R-squared 0.014 0.048 0.105 0.122 0.121 0.121
Kleibergen–Paap F-statistic 14.68
Panel D: Political interest
County-level spying density  0.091 0.078  0.120  0.179  0.261
(0.028) (0.045) (0.035) (0.026) (0.069)
District-level spying density  0.270
(0.043)
No. obs. 2,914 1,736 1,736 1,736 1,736 1,736
Adjusted R-squared 0.036 0.047 0.113 0.152 0.149 0.149
Kleibergen–Paap F-statistic 19.12
Panel E: Political engagement
County-level spying density 0.051 0.008  0.066  0.096  0.181
(0.028) (0.041) (0.029) (0.022) (0.047)
District-level spying density 0.188
(0.034)
No. obs. 2,914 1,736 1,736 1,736 1,736 1,736
Adjusted R-squared 0.019 0.043 0.102 0.124 0.126 0.121
Kleibergen–paap F-Statistic 19.12
Border county-pair fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
County-level control variables Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows the effect of a one standard deviation increase in surveillance intensity on different
measures of individual civic capital (see panels). The underlying econometric model is described in equations (1)
and (2). In column (1), we present simple correlations between the county-level spying density and the
corresponding outcome when using the full sample of counties. In columns (2)–(6), we limit the sample
to contiguous county pairs that straddle a GDR district border. Column (2) shows the corresponding simple
correlations for this sample. In columns (3) and (4), we present results based on our border design. In columns (5)
and (6), we combine the border design with our instrumental variables strategy. Column (5) presents the reduced-
form effect of the instrument, the leave-out average district-level spying density. Column (6) shows the respective
second-stage results. All outcome variables are standardized. All specifications include dummy variables for the
historical provinces of the Weimar Republic, a dummy variable indicating the presence of a Stasi on-site office,
and control variables for the individuals’ age and gender (see Section 4.1 for details). Cross-sectional weights are
adjusted for the duplication of counties that are part of multiple pairs. Standard errors are two-way clustered at
the county-pair and the county level. See Online Appendix B for detailed information on all variables. p < 0.1;
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per year on average. We show in Figure 3 that the probability of unemployment
is significantly affected, too. Panel B further shows that more intense government
surveillance decreases individuals’ time in self-employment (conditional on working)
by 1.6 percentage points, a finding in line with evidence that trust is an important asset
for entrepreneurs (Knack and Keefer 1997). Last, we present the effect of government
surveillance on labor/self-employment income conditional on working in Panel C of
Table 3. We find that a one standard deviation increase in the spying density decreases
monthly income by 0.056 log points (or €84) on average. Comparing this estimate to
evidence from the returns to schooling literature, our result suggests that a one standard
deviation increase in Stasi surveillance had the same effect on income as 0.6 years less
of schooling (cf. Card 1999).22 We show in Section 5.4 that educational attainment is
a key driver of the economic effects.
Overall, our results indicate that Stasi surveillance affected individuals’ economic
performance at both the extensive and the intensive margin, that is, conditional on
working. In Appendix Table A.2, we provide some additional evidence for this pattern.
We show that effects on income are larger when not conditioning on employment
(compare columns (1) and (2) to column (3)). Moreover, while Stasi surveillance
has no effect on individuals’ choice of being in the labor force (column (4)), we
find that a higher spying density has significantly negative effects on the probability
of being employed (columns (5)–(7)). Last, column (8) suggests that there is also a
negative effect of surveillance on working hours: a one standard deviation increase
in the spying density tends to decrease working time conditional on employment by
0.251 hours (0.7%). Note that the average effect on working hours is not significant at
conventional levels; however, we find significant results for individuals born between
1960 and 1973 (not reported).
Identification. Our results become stronger when implementing the identification
strategy step-by-step. While columns (1) and (2) of Tables 2 and 3 provide naive
raw correlations between our measure of government surveillance and the respective
outcomes in the full and border pair sample, we start tightening identification when
including county-pair fixed effects in column (3) and exploiting differences in the
spying density within county pairs at district borders only.23 Column (4) shows
the results of the standard border discontinuity model as described in equation (1),
including our set of county-level controls. In a last step, we set up our preferred
empirical model by combining the border design with an IV approach, taking the
22. The survey by Card (1999) suggests that the OLS coefficient on the returns to schooling is about
0.1 log points and close to estimates obtained when applying quasi-experimental research designs. We
confirm the survey’s OLS results using the SOEP, finding a returns to schooling estimate of about 0.1 for
West Germany.
23. While estimates generally become larger (in absolute terms) when moving from simple correlations
to our county-pair design, estimates flip sign in three of our eight outcomes. In light of the various
identification challenges discussed in Section 4.3, this demonstrates that simple correlations may be quite
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TABLE 3. The effect of spying on economic performance.
All counties Border county-pair sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Unemployment duration
County-level spying density 0.005 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.014
(0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
District-level spying density 0.014
(0.006)
No. obs. 2,880 1,719 1,719 1,719 1,719 1,719
Adjusted R-squared 0.041 0.049 0.135 0.161 0.161 0.161
Kleibergen–Paap F-statistic 20.81
Panel B: Self-employment
County-level spying density 0.000  0.001 0.008 0.008 0.016
(0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
District-level spying density 0.016
(0.005)
No. obs. 2,724 1,611 1,611 1,611 1,611 1,611
Adjusted R-squared 0.014 0.025 0.080 0.094 0.094 0.093
Kleibergen–Paap F-Statistic 18.76
Panel C: Log mean income
County-level spying density  0.041  0.015 0.030  0.044  0.056
(0.014) (0.017) (0.011) (0.013) (0.019)
District-level spying density 0.055
(0.026)
No. obs. 2,517 1,482 1,482 1,482 1,482 1,482
Adjusted R-squared 0.163 0.184 0.234 0.253 0.251 0.253
Kleibergen—Paap F-statistic 16.80
Border county-Pair fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
County-level control variables Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows the effect of a one standard deviation increase in surveillance intensity on different
measures of individual economic performance (see panels). The underlying econometric model is described in
equations (1) and (2). In column (1), we present simple correlations between the county-level spying density
and the corresponding outcome when using the full sample of counties. In columns (2)–(6), we limit the
sample to contiguous county pairs that straddle a GDR district border. Column (2) shows the corresponding
simple correlations for this sample. In columns (3) and (4), we present results based on our border design. In
columns (5) and (6), we combine the border design with our instrumental variables strategy. Column (5) presents
the reduced-form effect of the instrument, the leave-out average district-level spying density. Column (6) shows
the respective second-stage results. All specifications include dummy variables for the historical provinces of
the Weimar Republic, a dummy variable indicating the presence of a Stasi on-site office, and control variables
for the individuals’ age and gender (see Section 4.1 for details). Cross-sectional weights are adjusted for the
duplication of counties that are part of multiple pairs. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the county-pair







/jeea/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jeea/jvaa009/5823502 by guest on 26 N
ovem
ber 2020
26 Journal of the European Economic Association
leave-out average district-level surveillance intensity as an instrument. We report
the corresponding reduced form as well as the 2SLS estimates in columns (5)
and (6). Overall, the instrument proves to be reasonably strong with first-stage F-
statistics exceeding 10 for all outcomes and second-stage estimates being statistically
significant.24 For some outcomes, instrumenting the county-level spying density leads
to significantly larger estimates than in the pure border design. This suggests that the
additional IV approach further reduces biases due to endogeneity in the county-level
spying density. Interestingly, the reduction of the bias for civic capital and economic
outcomes goes in the same direction, which would be in line with a story that the
Stasi allocated more spies to counties with relatively higher levels of civic capital and
economic potential (see Section 4.3, “Sign of Bias”).
In the appendix, we additionally visualize the mechanics behind our identification
strategy. For example, in Panel A of Online Appendix Figure C.5, we first plot the
raw correlation between trust and the spying density at the county level, which is
mildly positive as reflected in column (1) of Table 2. Restricting the sample to border
counties and including county-pair fixed effects, as in column (4), changes the sign of
the correlation (Panel B). The change of sign demonstrates that that simple correlations
are not informative for inferring causality and can be quite misleading (see Section 4.3).
Panel C depicts the relationship in our 2SLS specification, which is more negative and
tighter. Figures C.6– C.12 in the Online Appendix show similar patterns for our other
outcomes. A second important insight we take from these graphs is that outliers do not
drive our results and—if anything—tend to bias estimates toward zero.
Last, we run an additional identification test that exploits the fact that a substantial
share of the new district borders were drawn through former Weimar provinces,
separating regions with the same cultural heritage (cf. Appendix Figure A.1). If
unobserved cultural differences existed across all county pairs, they should be smaller
at ahistorical borders, which, in turn, should tighten identification. Estimating an
interaction model that differentiates effects between pairs at historical and newly
drawn borders, we find that estimates are more precise for county pairs that share the
same cultural heritage (see Online Appendix Table D.3).
Dynamics and Persistence. We observe some of our civic capital and economic
variables on an (almost) annual basis (cf. Section 4.1). This enables us to investigate
the dynamics behind the average effects reported in Tables 2 and 3. In our main
specification, we form three-year bins—1990 to 1992, 1993 to 1995, etc.—and
estimate the IV specification separately for these groups of years, interacting all control
variables, including the county-pair fixed effects, with year dummies. We pool years
for two reasons: (i) to smooth outcomes and account for mean reversion, which is
particularly helpful for our economic outcomes, and (ii) to increase statistical power
by down-weighting potential outliers, which make estimates imprecise in the smaller
24. We find similar effects when using the overall district average instead of the leave-out-average as an
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yearly samples. In the Online Appendix, we show that yearly estimates look very
similar but are a little more bumpy and less precise, see Figure C.13 in the Online
Appendix.
Panels A and B of Figure 3 show that effects on the two measures of civic capital—
political interest and political engagement—are statistically significantly negative
immediately after reunification, whereas effects on unemployment and income become
significant by the mid-1990s (see Panels C and D). This pattern is in line with our
theoretical prior that lower levels of civic capital eventually lead to worse economic
outcomes in a market economy. From the mid-1990s onward, effects for all four
outcomes are relatively stable until the early years of the new century. In the course of
the 2000s, the problem of smaller annual samples becomes more severe as individuals
drop out due to retirement or death. By 2005, the number of individuals is less than
half compared to 1990. We address this natural attrition in two ways: first, we simply
exclude years 2005–2010 from the analysis and report the coefficient for the years
2002–2004 as our last dynamic estimate (black dot); secondly, we pool years 2002–
2010 and report the corresponding coefficient (gray square). Overall, we detect some
reversion for our outcomes—in particular, when taking into account the years from
2005 to 2010. However, when pooling the respective years, economic effects are still
statistically significant in the late 2000s.
To test the dynamics and persistence of our effects in more detail, we further
make use of regional, administrative data that does not suffer from attrition and re-
estimate our border-IV model at the local rather than the individual level. In terms of
civic capital, we use county-level data on voter turnout in the two federal elections
in 1990 (the last Volkskammerwahl as the only free election in the GDR and the first
Bundestagswahl in reunited Germany) to see whether we detect effects on civic capital
immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In addition, we look at voter turnout
statistics at the municipal level for the federal election in 2009. To measure local
economic performance, we use social security data at the municipal level and construct
measures of local wage levels and unemployment (see Online Appendix B for details).
Although the collected data offer very precise information on local voter turnout and
economic performance, they come at the cost that we cannot assign treatment based on
individuals’ county of residence in 1989. Consequently, these estimates do not account
for (potentially selective) migration after reunification.
Appendix Table A.3 presents the corresponding results. In Panels A and B, we
contrast individual and local-level estimates. Overall, effects are comparable and do
not systematically deviate in any direction—although effects on our local measures of
wages and unemployment are a bit smaller. Panel C further confirms that effects of
surveillance on civic capital (turnout) are detectable immediately after reunification and
smaller in the late 2000s—also see our discussion in the next paragraph. Overall, we
consider this immediate effect of government surveillance on civic capital as evidence
that the Stasi’s activities shattered the trust of individuals during the time of the GDR
and that our effects are not due to the revelation of the extent of Stasi surveillance
post reunification. In terms of economic performance, Panel C further corroborates our
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FIGURE 3. The effect of spying—dynamics over time. This figure shows the effect of a one standard
deviation increase in surveillance intensity on different measures of individual civic capital and
economic performance for different periods of our sample. Estimates are based on our IV specification
and obtained from separate regressions, pooling data over three year periods (1990–92, 1993–95,
etc.). Dark circles show our baseline estimates for the period between 1990 and 2004 (excluding
the years 2005–10); light squares report alternative estimates for the last period, pooling the years
2002–2010 instead. In all regressions, we interact the set of county-pair fixed effects, the dummies for
historical provinces of the Weimar Republic, the dummy variable indicating the presence of a Stasi
on-site office, and our full set of controls (as described in Section 4.1) with year dummies. Outcomes
in Panels (A) and (B) are standardized. Cross-sectional weights are adjusted for multiple person-
year observations and the duplication of counties that are part of multiple pairs. Standard errors are
two-way clustered at the county-pair and the county level (vertical bars indicate 95% confidence
intervals). Source: See Online Appendix B for detailed information on all variables.
a lag. Moreover, effects on economic performance are still sizable and statistically
significant at the end of the 2000s.
Last, we return to our survey data and investigate differential effects of spying
by age groups to explore whether the effect of surveillance might eventually vanish.
We extend the baseline sample (birth cohorts until 1973) and add the children of our
respondents (birth cohorts 1974 and later) to the analysis. These respondents only
spent parts of their childhood under the regime, such that effects of surveillance might
be smaller due to lower exposure. Panel A of Online Appendix Table D.4 shows
that effects are indeed smaller across outcomes (although statistically significant in
most cases) for the children generation (born 1974 or later). In line with the exposure
hypothesis, our findings suggest that negative effects of Stasi surveillance on civic
capital might be even smaller for the generation born after reunification.25
25. Unfortunately, we cannot dig deeper and rigorously test for intergenerational effects as we only
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5.2. Sensitivity Checks
We next provide a range of robustness checks to make sure that (the significance of)
our baseline estimates do(es) not depend on modeling choices.
Other Measures of Government Surveillance. Although the number of operative
informers is arguably the most natural measure of surveillance intensity (cf. Section 2),
we show in Online Appendix Table D.5 that results remain robust when using
alternative definitions of our measure of government surveillance, such as the total
number of informers or when additionally including the number of official Stasi
employees (columns (2) and (3)). Moreover, although informers were seen as the main
weapon of the Stasi, the collected evidence occasionally led to more visible actions
of the regime, such as arrests. Therefore, we further test whether local differences
in political (or total) arrests rather than differences in surveillance drive our effects
on trust and economics performance. To this end, we acquired official microdata on
detained individuals in East Germany for the years from 1984 to 1988 (see Online
Appendix Table B.1 for more details). Although it is not straightforward to distill the
number of political arrests from the data in light of nonexclusive, partially inconsistent,
and potentially biased categorizations of criminal offenses (see Schröder and Wilke
1998, for a critical discussion), we make a modest effort to come up with a county-level
measure of politically motivated arrests per capita. We find that effects are basically
unchanged when controlling for these measures in our baseline model, see columns (5)
and (6) of Online Appendix Table D.5. This finding is backed with the slightly positive,
yet overall rather unsystematic (conditional) correlation between the county-level
number of (political) arrests and the respective spying density (Figure C.14 in the
Online Appendix). The result is also in line with our interpretation of the historical
evidence that the large network of informers served as the regime’s most important
measure to ensure political stability and oppress oppositional movements before they
even started (Childs and Popplewell 1996).
Inference. Standard errors of our baseline results are two-way clustered at the county-
pair and county-in-1990 level. As discussed previously, we choose this default to
account for common shocks within county pairs as well as the duplication of certain
counties. One-way clustering at either the county-pair or county-in-1990 level yields
very similar standard errors. Moreover, two-way clustering at the person and county-
pair level does not affect inference. As parts of the identifying variation are induced by
differences in surveillance strategies across districts, we further cluster standard errors
at the county-pair and district level in one specification. Due to the small number
of districts/clusters (N D 14), we further implement this specification by means of
the standard percentile-t Wild cluster bootstrap approach as proposed by Cameron,
Gelbach, and Miller (2008). We implement the Wild bootstrap for reduced-form
estimates only as we are not aware of any procedure that accounts for the few-cluster
problem in an IV setting. As an alternative test, we further conduct randomization
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methods to draw inference (Kempthorne 1955; Young 2019). Following Fouka and
Voth (2016), we perform 2,999 random permutations of the dependent variable and
re-estimate model (1) for each permutation. We combine these with the original,
nonpermuted estimate to calculate the empirical p-values. Online Appendix Table D.6
demonstrates that inference is robust across the different tests; the only notable
exception being the effect on self-employment, for which we find p-values slightly
above 0.1 when using the Wild cluster bootstrap and the randomization inference test.
County Pairs. As mentioned in Section 4.2, there are various ways to define the
county pair estimation sample in case of multiple neighbors across one or more district
borders. Our baseline specification is as follows: for a given county, we only consider
the neighboring county that shares the longest border. This practice still leads to the
duplication of counties if a given border is not the longest one for both counties within
a pair or a rather large county spans over two or more counties on the other side of a
district border (see Online Appendix Figure C.15 for an example). We account for the
duplications of counties by clustering standard errors at the county-pair and county
level, and dividing individual weights by the number of duplications (see preceding
and following paragraphs). We also provide estimates based on (i) an extensive set of
county pairs, duplicating each county according to all its available neighbors across
district borders, and (ii) a specification without any duplicates, dropping the smallest
pairs in case of duplications. Columns (1)–(3) of Online Appendix Table D.7 shows
that results are not affected by the definition of county pairs.
Weighting. In line with the recommendations of the SOEP, we use survey weights
in all our baseline regressions to correct for biases due to the over-sampling of low-
income households and potential attrition due to unemployment as stressed in Solon,
Haider, and Wooldridge (2015).26 Columns (4) and (5) of Online Appendix Table D.7
show that estimates are similar when (i) using individual weights that are not adjusted
for the duplication of counties and (ii) not using survey weights.
5.3. Alternative Mechanisms
Throughout the paper, we assume that Stasi surveillance reduced individuals’ civic
capital, which in turn affected economic performance. In this subsection, we test
whether alternative mechanisms may (partly) account for the observed effects.
The Effect of Socialism. We first investigate whether local differences in socialist
indoctrination rather than state surveillance may account for the observed differences
in civic capital and economic performance. Two important studies document that East
Germans’ exposure to socialism had long-lasting effects on political attitudes (Alesina
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and Fuchs-Schündeln 2007) and labor market outcomes through education (Fuchs-
Schündeln and Masella 2016). To test this alternative mechanism, we proxy regional
socialist indoctrination by the share of the political and economic elites who were
members of the regime party (Socialist Unity Party, SED) and add this variable as a
control. Results remain unchanged (cf. column (4) of Online Appendix Table D.5),
which is in line with the rather unsystematic correlation between the spying density
and our proxy of local differences in socialist indoctrination (see Figure C.16 in the
Online Appendix).
Distance to West Germany. Next, we investigate whether differences in a county’s
distance to the inner German border might drive our results. One may be concerned
that counties closer to the border (within a county pair) had systematically higher
surveillance intensities. Moreover, it may well be the case that individuals’ geographic
proximity to the West had a direct effect on civic capital (e.g., due to the extended
visitors program that facilitated visits of West Germans in selected counties, see
Stegmann 2018) and post-reunification economic activity (e.g., due to better access
to West German markets, see Redding and Sturm 2008). Table D.8 in the Online
Appendix shows that our estimates are robust to including various distance measures.
Risk Aversion and Personality Traits. In addition to civic capital, the Stasi may
have also affected individuals’ risk preferences, which may in turn account for (parts
of) the observed differences in economic performance as individuals’ preferences
for risk taking have been shown to positively correlate with wage growth and the
returns to education (Shaw 1996). However, column (1) of Appendix Table A.4
shows that risk aversion is unaffected by government surveillance. Similarly, the
Stasi may have changed personality traits, which could be driving (parts of) the
economic effects. Among others, Borghans et al. (2008) show that personality
traits predict economic outcomes such as educational attainment and wages. To
test this potential alternative mechanism, we estimate the effect of spying on
the Big Five personality traits “Extraversion”, “Neuroticism”, “Conscientiousness”,
“Openness”, and “Agreeableness”. However, as indicated in columns (2)–(6) of
Appendix Table A.4, only one of the Big Five personality traits—“Agreeableness”—is
significantly negatively affected by a higher spying density. We interpret this result
in favor of our hypothesis that Stasi surveillance affected civic capital since trust and
altruism are two of the six dimensions that constitute the measure of “Agreeableness”
in the SOEP (Gerlitz and Schupp 2005).
Preferences for Redistribution and Political Preferences. Last, we analyze whether
the observed economic effects are (partly) due to surveillance-induced differences
in preferences for redistribution or general party preferences, which may have been
affected by the surveillance state as well. Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) show
that East Germans generally express higher preferences for state intervention than
West Germans and link these differences to the socialist system. We test whether
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preferences for redistribution within East Germany, but do not find any statistically
significant effect (see columns (1)–(6) of Appendix Table A.5). Relatedly, the influence
of the Stasi might also be reflected in people’s preferences for extreme parties,
which, in turn, may be associated with negative economic outcomes. We test for
effects on extreme voting behavior in columns (7)–(9) of Appendix Table A.5. We
find a marginally significant effect on overall political extremism, operationalized by
individuals’ stated preferences for either the far-left or the far-right political spectrum.
When decomposing the effect into preferences for either the extreme left or extreme
right, we find similar effects at both ends of the distribution—however, we cannot rule
out that effects are zero. We take this finding as further suggestive evidence that the
surveillance state led to distrust in the political system, which is also reflected in a
move away from moderate political views.
5.4. Underlying Channels
In the following subsection, we look at channels behind the overall economic effects
documented in Table 3 and aim at corroborating our hypothesis that reductions in civic
capital can explain parts of the economic effects observed.
Migration. First, we look at the role of migration after reunification, which could
have affected both civic capital and economic performance. In the context of the GDR,
this channel is particularly interesting as many people left East Germany and migrated
to the West after 1990. In Panel A, column (1) of Table D.9 in the Online Appendix,
we show that Stasi surveillance had no significant impact on individuals’ probability to
leave the pre-reunification county of residence. Neither do we find differential effects
when allowing for heterogeneity by education, gender or age (not shown). In Panel B
of this table we further show that effects on civic capital and economic performance
are similar when allowing for heterogeneous effects for individuals that moved from
or stayed in the 1989 county of residence after reunification. However, given that any
mobility response post reunification may in itself be driven by the spying density, these
findings should not be interpreted causally. We rather take these findings as suggestive
evidence that selection effects are not driving our results. In line with this interpretation,
our estimates are unaffected when additionally controlling for county-level population
changes since 1988, see Panel C of Online Appendix Table D.9. Last, we test whether
the spying density of the current (rather than the 1989) county of residence is able
to explain effects on civic capital and economic performance for movers within East
Germany. Results in Panel D suggest that this is not the case.
Deconstructing the Economic Effect. Next, we investigate the effects of Stasi
surveillance on educational attainment. As displayed in Table 4, we find that
educational outcomes are negatively affected by more intense surveillance.27 A one
27. We find no differential effects of spying on civic capital or economic performance by individuals’
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TABLE 4. The effect of spying on education and job characteristics.
Years of Vocational University In job as Occup.
education education degree trained for prestige
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Average effects
County-level spying density  0.280  0.029  0.034  0.056  0.119
(0.092) (0.010) (0.021) (0.016) (0.041)
No. obs. 1,736 1,736 1,736 1,467 1,483
Adjusted R-squared 0.162 0.202 0.109 0.103 0.137
Kleibergen–Paap F-Statistic 19.12 19.12 19.12 16.75 16.87
Panel B: Effects by age
District-level spying density
 Born before 1945  0.204  0.033  0.011 0.052  0.080
(0.141) (0.013) (0.028) (0.023) (0.073)
 Born 1945–1959  0.299 0.028  0.043 0.061  0.132
(0.140) (0.011) (0.027) (0.022) (0.056)
 Born 1960–1973 0.408 0.033 0.062 0.060 0.161
(0.125) (0.011) (0.026) (0.023) (0.049)
No. obs. 1,736 1,736 1,736 1,467 1,483
Adjusted R-squared 0.173 0.209 0.122 0.105 0.142
Border county-pair fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County-level control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows the effect of a one standard deviation increase in surveillance intensity on different
measures of education and job characteristics (see columns). The underlying econometric model is described
in equations (1) and (2). In Panel A, we present average effects for the five outcomes, in Panel B we show
heterogeneous effects by age groups. Outcomes in column (5) are standardized. All estimates are based on our
sample of contiguous county pairs that straddle a GDR district border and include county-pair fixed effects,
dummy variables for the historical provinces of the Weimar Republic, a dummy variable indicating the presence
of a Stasi on-site office, control variables for the individuals’ age and gender, as well as the different sets of county-
level control variables (see Section 4.1 for details). Cross-sectional weights are adjusted for the duplication of
counties that are part of multiple pairs. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the county-pair and the county
level. See Online Appendix B for detailed information on all variables. p < 0.05; p < 0.01.
standard deviation increase in the spying density decreases individuals’ years of
education by 0.28 years on average. In line with this finding, the probability of
having some vocational training or a university degree decreases with more intense
surveillance (the latter effect being slightly insignificant at conventional levels).
Assuming an additional year of schooling to yield an increase in income of around
0.1 log points (see the previous section), surveillance-induced reductions in education
can account for a decrease in income of about 0.03 log points, which is roughly half
of the estimated income coefficient (0.056).
Importantly, the Stasi could have systematically affected educational attainment in
two ways. First, there might have been a direct link since the regime denied allegedly
oppositional citizens access to universities or apprenticeships (Bruce 2010). Second,
there may have been an indirect channel as social capital has been shown to be a
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relevance of both channels, we allow for differential treatment effects by birth cohorts.
If the reductions in educational attainment were merely due to direct expulsions by
the Stasi, effects should be weakest for the youngest of our three cohorts (individuals
born 1960–1973 and aged 16–29 in 1989) as they could have more easily invested
in additional education after reunification than older cohorts. In contrast, we find
that the effects for this cohort are—if anything—stronger than for older individuals
(cf. Panel B of Table 4), which suggests that the indirect channel was important.
Of course, this assertion assumes that cohorts only differed in their opportunities to
invest in education after reunification, which is a strong assumption in light of the
substantial age differences across our cohorts. Moreover, the finding does not suggest
that the direct channel was irrelevant but rather implies that the indirect one was at
play, too.
Next, we investigate whether surveillance affected the type of occupation(s)
individuals held after reunification. Estimates in column (4) of Table 4 indicate that
this was the case: individuals exposed to a higher spying density were less likely to
work in the job they were trained for after reunification. Along with the results on
reduced occupational prestige (column (5)), a possible interpretation of these findings
is that individuals exposed to a higher spying density were downgraded in terms of
their occupations, possibly because of lower levels of civic capital.
In a final step, we directly assess the role of civic capital for our reduced form
effects of spying on education, occupational choice, and our three measures of
economic performance. Sacrificing some econometric rigor28, we estimate the effects
of government surveillance on these five outcomes while controlling for our measures
of civic capital. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 reveal that effects on education and
occupational prestige become smaller when conditioning on trust, which is another
suggestive piece of evidence that the indirect channel—Stasi surveillance lowering
civic capital and reduced civic capital impeding educational investment—is relevant.
As previously mentioned, this does not rule out any direct effect of surveillance
on individuals’ educational attainment for given levels of civic capital. The fact that
coefficients in Panel C are still different from zero (although not statistically significant)
hints at the fact that the direct channel is important as well. A similar argument holds
true for our effects on income and unemployment duration, where coefficients also
decrease and become statistically insignificant once conditioning on civic capital but
are not entirely explained away. Overall, we thus take these findings as suggestive
evidence that the surveillance-induced reductions in civic capital are one driver of the
sizable economic effects, which is in line with our theoretical priors and the dynamic
pattern displayed in Figure 3.
28. We control for an outcome, which gives rise to the well-known bad control problem. We would need
additional instruments to cleanly attribute the observed effects on economic performance to (a specific
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Lichter, Löffler, and Siegloch The Long-Term Costs of Government Surveillance 35
TABLE 5. The effect of spying on economic performance conditional on civic capital.
Years of Occup. Unemploy. Self- Log mean
education prestige duration employment income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Baseline effects
County-level spying density  0.280  0.119 0.014  0.016  0.056
(0.092) (0.041) (0.005) (0.007) (0.019)
No. obs. 1,736 1,483 1,719 1,611 1,482
Adjusted R-squared 0.162 0.137 0.161 0.093 0.253
Kleibergen–Paap F-statistic 19.12 16.87 20.81 18.76 16.80
Panel B: Reduced sample
County-level spying density  0.177  0.107 0.013  0.001  0.057
(0.109) (0.042) (0.007) (0.008) (0.026)
No. obs. 947 843 939 890 841
Adjusted R-squared 0.189 0.206 0.219 0.145 0.328
Kleibergen–Paap F-statistic 13.13 27.13 17.66 15.26 26.62
Panel C: Conditional on civic capital
County-level spying density 0.032 0.055 0.005 0.003 0.042
(0.104) (0.042) (0.007) (0.007) (0.025)
No. obs. 947 843 939 890 841
Adjusted R-squared 0.273 0.293 0.255 0.160 0.375
Kleibergen–Paap F-statistic 12.71 26.57 17.12 14.75 26.13
Border county-pair fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County-level control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows the effect of a one standard deviation increase in surveillance intensity on different
measures of education, job characteristics, and economic performance (see columns). The underlying econometric
model is described in equations (1) and (2). In Panel A, we present baseline effects from Tables 3 and 4. Panel B
shows results when estimating the same model using the subsample of individuals for which we observe all five
measures of civic capital (see Table 2). In Panel C, we additionally control for our five measures of civic capital.
Outcomes in column (2) are standardized. All estimates are based on our sample of contiguous county pairs that
straddle a GDR district border and include county-pair fixed effects, dummy variables for the historical provinces
of the Weimar Republic, a dummy variable indicating the presence of a Stasi on-site office, control variables for
the individuals’ age and gender, as well as the different sets of county-level control variables (see Section 4.1
for details). Cross-sectional weights are adjusted for the duplication of counties that are part of multiple pairs.
Standard errors are two-way clustered at the county-pair and the county level. See Online Appendix B for detailed
information on all variables. p < 0.1; p < 0.05; p < 0.01.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the effect of state surveillance on civic capital and economic
performance. We study the case of the former socialist German Democratic Republic
that implemented one of the largest surveillance systems of all time and exploit
county-level variation in the density of Stasi informers. To account for the nonrandom
recruitment of informers across counties, we harness the specific institutional features
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Overall, the results of our study offer substantial evidence for negative and long-
lasting effects of government surveillance. We find strong and consistent evidence
that a higher density of informers negatively affects civic capital by undermining
individuals’ interpersonal trust, cooperative behavior, and political engagement. We
further find negative and persistent effects of government surveillance on measures of
economic performance, such as the probability of employment or self-employment and
income (un)conditional on employment. Moreover, we show that reduced educational
attainment can explain roughly half of the negative economic effects. We also find
evidence for the theoretical prediction that individuals with lower trust/civic capital
invest less in (human) capital and experience negative economic effects.
The magnitudes of our effects are meaningful. Translated into monetary terms, a
one standard deviation increase in the spying density decreases monthly gross income
by €108 (€84 conditional on working). We can use these estimates to make a careful
back-of-the-envelop (and out-of-sample) calculation to predict the overall contribution
of the Stasi to the prevailing income gap between East and West Germany. To this end,
we infer from our data that counterfactually abolishing the Stasi is equal to a decrease
of 2.84 standard deviations in the spying density on average. The East-West gap in
GDP (wages) over the period 1991–2010 is 72% (39%).29 Taking our estimates at face
value, the Stasi can account for up to around 50% of the East-West gap in economic
performance.30
Our results add to the literature on institutions, trust, and economic performance
(see, e.g., Alesina and Giuliano 2015, for a survey). First, our study establishes a causal
link between formal institutions (surveillance) and culture (trust). Second, and in line
with Tabellini (2010), we provide evidence that the degree of democratic governance
affects economic outcomes. Third, with both trust and economic performance being
impaired by government surveillance, our findings also provide suggestive evidence in
favor of a well-established channel: institutions shape people’s trust, and trust affects
economic development (Algan and Cahuc 2014). In this respect, we, fourth, add to the
understanding of the effects of repression in autocratic regimes, which generally make
use of large-scale surveillance systems. Last, we show that our effects are persistent
and still detectable two decades after the end of the socialist regime. However, it
seems that the legacy of the Stasi may eventually fade out as the children of our
sampled citizens (born between 1974 and 1990) exhibit smaller effects than the parent
generation. This implies that the negative effects of Stasi surveillance on trust are at
least not transmitted one to one to the next generation (see, e.g., Nunn and Wantchekon
2011; Dohmen et al. 2012, for studies on the intergenerational transmission of trust
and beliefs). Whether the legacy of Stasi surveillance will eventually fade out remains
an open question that has to be investigated in future research; a partial answer could
29. We take the East-West gap in GDP from the Working Group Regional Accounts of the Statistical
Offices and derive the corresponding gap in wages from the SOEP.
30. Without Stasi surveillance, the East-West gap in income would be lower by factor 0.44 D
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be given once children born after 1990 turn adults and information about their trust
levels and economic performance becomes available.
Another important question is how our findings translate to other (contemporary)
forms of mass surveillance in autocratic states given that surveillance strategies have
changed over the last decades and nowadays rely arguably more on technology than
individual informers.31 It is likely that this shift toward electronic surveillance modes
renders the findings for interpersonal trust within the social network less important.
At the same time, it seems plausible that trust in institutions could still be affected by
modern forms of surveillance. After the revelation of the NSA wiretapping and the
Snowden affair, for example, anecdotal evidence suggests that citizens did not know
which communication companies to trust (see, e.g., Schneier 2013). Moreover, a large
share of people stated that they had adjusted their use of telecommunications as a
consequence of the affair (Pew Research Center 2014). The Snowden affair further
points to another conceptual issue when generalizing our findings—the question
of whether effects of government surveillance are different in a democracy. Both
democratic and autocratic regimes would justify surveillance with the need to secure
the stability of the system—hence with benevolent motives, whereas the (perceived)
degree of benevolence is, of course, highly subjective. Separating negative and positive
aspects of surveillance is notoriously difficult, and researchers will most likely only be
able to assess the net effect of surveillance. The findings of this study show that the net
effect of government surveillance on trust and economic performance was negative in
the case of socialist East Germany. Net effects of state surveillance in other systems
and at different times may vary and should be studied case-by-case.
31. Nevertheless, contemporaneous regimes still make use of informers to control their citizens. Various
accounts state that China still heavily relies on a large network of informers (see, e.g., Branigan 2010;
Jacobs and Ansfield 2011; Yu 2014). Likewise, Russia has been observed to re-implement surveillance
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Appendix A: Additional Material
FIGURE A.1. GDR districts and provinces of the Weimar Republic. This figure shows GDR district
borders and historical borders of the states of the Weimar Republic and the Prussian provinces as of
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FIGURE A.2. Smoothness of industrial composition. This figure tests the smoothness of county-level
employment shares in various industries at district borders. Each coefficient is estimated separately
by regressing the respective employment share on the spying density, the set of county-pair fixed
effects as well as dummy variables for the historical provinces of the Weimar Republic. All outcome
variables are standardized. Population weights are adjusted for the duplication of counties that are part
of multiple county pairs. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the county and county-pair level
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TABLE A.1. Covariate smoothness at GDR district borders.
All counties Border county pair sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log mean population 1980–1988  0.588  0.316  0.269  0.137
(0.132) (0.113) (0.119) (0.232)
Log county size 0.300 0.199 0.028  0.054
(0.092) (0.112) (0.078) (0.209)
City county  0.387  0.174  0.085 0.012
(0.122) (0.170) (0.076) (0.019)
Share of population aged under 15, 1989 0.353 0.302 0.131  0.105
(0.098) (0.122) (0.108) (0.178)
Share of population aged over 64, 1989  0.200  0.235  0.084 0.093
(0.095) (0.110) (0.114) (0.258)
Log industrial output 1989  0.429  0.253  0.086  0.078
(0.118) (0.152) (0.134) (0.227)
Share agricultural employment 09/1989 0.417 0.263 0.089  0.066
(0.098) (0.137) (0.125) (0.198)
Employment share energy industry 09/1989 0.120 0.158 0.177 0.110
(0.095) (0.136) (0.175) (0.256)
Employment share textile and clothing 09/1989  0.160  0.205  0.169 0.076
(0.065) (0.115) (0.120) (0.282)
Share of cooperative workers 09/1989 0.404 0.271 0.115  0.109
(0.097) (0.128) (0.120) (0.200)
Uprising 1953: strike, demonstration, riot  0.130  0.087  0.064 0.175
(0.076) (0.098) (0.093) (0.207)
Electoral turnout 1933  0.260  0.197  0.020  0.075
(0.108) (0.132) (0.093) (0.189)
Vote share Nazi party (NSDAP) 1933 0.387 0.214 0.122  0.036
(0.108) (0.102) (0.105) (0.201)
Vote share Communist party (KPD) 1933  0.437  0.232  0.143 0.050
(0.117) (0.122) (0.119) (0.145)
Share protestants 1925 0.172 0.184 0.215  0.001
(0.053) (0.068) (0.079) (0.128)
Share Jews 1925  0.417  0.093  0.068 0.225
(0.210) (0.136) (0.097) (0.193)
Share of white-collar workers 1933  0.448  0.129  0.040 0.194
(0.140) (0.118) (0.117) (0.181)
Self-employment rate 1933 0.451 0.130 0.119 0.074
(0.094) (0.117) (0.114) (0.157)
Unemployment rate 1933  0.555  0.298  0.106 0.122
(0.103) (0.110) (0.097) (0.217)
Weimar province fixed effects Yes Yes
County-pair fixed effects Yes
Counties 148 78 78 78
County pairs 51 51 51
Joint F-test 7.883 4.316 2.835 1.240
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.265
Notes: This table presents the results of our covariate smoothness test. In column (1), we separately regress each
covariate on the spying density using the full set of counties in the SOEP. Specification (2) is based on our border
county-pair sample. Column (3) adds the set of Weimar Province fixed effects to control for persistent differences
across Weimar Provinces. In column (4), we further include border county-pair fixed effects, identification is
thus only within county pairs at district borders. All variables have been standardized in the respective sample.
Population weights are adjusted for duplications of counties that are part of multiple county pairs. Standard errors
are two-way clustered at the county and county-pair level. The reported F-test statistics and the corresponding
p-values test the null hypothesis of all coefficients being jointly equal to zero in a stacked regression (Lee
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Panel A: Average effects on SOEP data
District-level spying density 0.107 0.131 0.084
(0.044) (0.061) (0.034)
No. obs. 1,583 1,482 1,719
Adjusted R-squared 0.121 0.251 0.161
Panel B: Average effects on administrative sata
District-level spying sensity  0.166 0.072 0.068
(0.051) (0.028) (0.039)
No. obs. 3,515 56,284 38,158
Adjusted R-squared 0.019 0.002 0.002
Panel C: Effects over time on administrative data
District-level spying density
 Year 1990 0.193
(0.076)
 Year 1992 0.042
(0.020)
 Year 1998 0.025
(0.043)
 Year 2009 0.109
(0.055)
 Year 2010  0.121 0.093
(0.037) (0.034)
No. obs. 3,515 5,961 5,887
Adjusted R-squared 0.020 0.004 0.002
Notes: This table shows the effect of a one standard deviation increase in surveillance intensity on different
measures of local civic capital and economic performance using administrative data. The underlying econometric
model is described in equations (1) and (2), using the leave-out instrument as our main regressor. To ease
comparison across datasets, Panel A replicates our baseline estimates using the SOEP data and standardizing
outcomes. Panel B presents average effects over time when using the administrative data, Panel C shows effects
separately for the first and the last year of observation in the corresponding administrative datasets. Voter turnout
is observed in March and December 1990 as well as September 2009; average daily wages are observed from 1992
to 2010 on a yearly basis, annual local unemployment rates during the period 1998–2010. We match municipalities
to counties in 1990 using geographic coordinates provided by the German Federal Agency for Cartography and
Geodesy. All estimates are based on the sample of contiguous county pairs that straddle a GDR district border. In
all regressions, we interact the set of county-pair fixed effects, the dummy variables for the historical provinces of
the Weimar Republic, the dummy variable indicating the presence of a Stasi on-site office, and our set of control
variables (see Section 4.1 for details) with year dummies. Observations are weighted by the 1990 population in
column (1) and the number of workers in 1992 in columns (2) and (3), respectively. Weights are adjusted for the
duplication of counties that are part of multiple pairs. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the county-pair
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TABLE A.4. The effect of spying on risk aversion and personality traits.
Big five personality traits
Risk Extra- Neuro- Conscien- Open- Agree-
aversion version ticism tiousness ness ableness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
County-level spying density 0.013 0.033  0.096  0.084  0.034  0.275
(0.086) (0.071) (0.073) (0.052) (0.055) (0.074)
No. obs. 1,874 1,650 1,653 1,642 1,650 1,647
Adjusted R-squared 0.104 0.185 0.164 0.159 0.171 0.142
Kleibergen–Paap F-statistic 14.26 13.25 13.09 13.52 13.53 13.34
Notes: This table shows the effect of a one standard deviation increase in surveillance intensity on individual
risk aversion and different personality traits. All estimates are based on our instrumental variables specification
as defined in equations (1) and (2). Outcome variables are standardized. All estimates are based on the sample
of contiguous county pairs that straddle a GDR district border and include county-pair fixed effects, dummy
variables for the historical provinces of the Weimar Republic, a dummy variable indicating the presence of a Stasi
on-site office, control variables for the individuals’ age and gender, as well as the different set of county-level
control variables (see Section 4.1 for details). Cross-sectional weights are adjusted for the duplication of counties
that are part of multiple pairs. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the county-pair and the county level. See
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Grdešić, Marko (2014). “Television and Protest in East Germany’s Revolution, 1989–1990: A Mixed-






/jeea/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jeea/jvaa009/5823502 by guest on 26 N
ovem
ber 2020
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und Schriften der Europäischen Akademie Otzenhausen, Vol. 88, edited by Heiner Timmermann.
Duncker & Humboldt, Berlin, pp. 191–220.
Knack, Stephen and Philip Keefer (1997). “Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A
Cross-Country Investigation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 1251–1288.
Kotsch, Detlev and Harald Engler (2017). “Staat und Staatspartei. Die Verwaltungsreform der SED in
Brandenburg 1952–1960.” In Bildung und Etablierung der DDR-Bezirke in Brandenburg, edited
by Oliver Werner, Detlev Kotsch, and Harald Engler. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, pp. 15–56.
Kowalczuk, Ilko-Sascha (2013). Stasi Konkret. Überwachung und Repression in der DDR. C.H.
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